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Abstract—This paper studies a secrecy unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) communication system with coordinated multi-
point (CoMP) reception, in which one UAV sends confidential
messages to a set of distributed ground nodes (GNs) that can
cooperate in signal detection, in the presence of several colluding
suspicious eavesdroppers. Different from prior works considering
the two-dimensional (2D) horizontal trajectory design in the
non-CoMP scenario, this paper additionally exploits the UAV’s
vertical trajectory (or altitude) control for further improving the
secrecy communication performance with CoMP. In particular,
we jointly optimize the three dimensional (3D) trajectory and
transmit power allocation of the UAV to maximize the average
secrecy rate at GNs over a particular flight period, subject
to the UAV’s maximum flight speed and maximum transmit
power constraints. To solve the non-convex optimization prob-
lem, we propose an alternating-optimization-based approach,
which optimizes the transmit power allocation and trajectory
design in an alternating manner, by convex optimization and
successive convex approximation (SCA), respectively. Numerical
results show that in the scenario with CoMP reception, our
proposed 3D trajectory optimization significantly outperforms
the conventional 2D horizontal trajectory design, by exploiting
the additional degree of freedom in vertical trajectory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are envisioned
to play an important role in fifth-generation (5G) and beyond
cellular networks. On one hand, UAVs are emerged as a new
type of aerial users that need to access cellular networks
for enhanced communication quality and longer operation
range [1]. On the other hand, UAVs can also be employed
as new wireless platforms (e.g., base stations, relays, and
even wireless chargers) in the sky to provide flexible and
on-demand wireless services to ground users, with improved
transmission efficiency and better wireless coverage (see, e.g.,
[2–5] and the references therein).
However, due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels
and the existence of strong line-of-sight (LoS) components
over air-to-ground (A2G) links, UAV communications are
more vulnerable to be eavesdropped by malicious ground
nodes than conventional terrestrial communications. Recently,
physical layer security is becoming a viable new solution to
protect UAV communications against malicious eavesdropping
attacks (see, e.g., [6, 7] and the references therein). Differ-
ent from conventional cryptology-based security technology,
physical layer security is able to provide perfect security
for wireless communication systems from an information
theoretical perspective. Therefore, it is emerging and of great
J. Xu is the corresponding author.
importance to conduct research on physical layer security in
UAV communications.
In the literature, there have been various prior works
investigating the integration of physical layer security in UAV
communications and networks. In general, these works can
be roughly classified into two categories that considered the
network-level performance analysis for large-scale random
UAV networks via stochastic geometry [8, 9], and the link-
level performance optimization via UAV trajectory design and
wireless resource allocation [10–18], respectively. We are par-
ticularly interested in the link-level performance optimization
in this paper.
Due to the high maneuverability, UAVs can properly control
their locations over time (i.e., trajectories) as new design
degrees of freedom for improving the secrecy communication
performance (e.g., [10–18]). In particular, legitimate UAV
transmitters can fly close to intended ground receivers to
improve the legitimate channel quality and move far away
from suspicious eavesdroppers to prevent the information
leakage, thus improving the security of legitimate transmission
[10–12]. Furthermore, UAVs can also be employed as aerial
cooperative jammers that send artificial noise (AN) to con-
fuse eavesdroppers, thus efficiently protecting the legitimate
communications. For instance, [13, 14] proposed to use a
friendly aerial UAV jammer transmitting AN to help secure the
communications between two ground nodes (GNs). [15–18]
utilized one cooperative UAV jammer to secure the legitimate
communication of another UAV, in which the communicat-
ing and jamming UAVs jointly design their trajectories and
power allocations for performance optimization. Nevertheless,
these existing works on secrecy UAV communications mainly
focused on a point-to-point legitimate UAV communication
scenario from one legitimate UAV to one GN in the presence
of suspicious eavesdroppers, in which the UAV flies at a fixed
altitude and only adjusts its two-dimensional (2D) horizontal
trajectory for performance optimization.
Recently, coordinated multi-point (CoMP) transmission and
reception has been recognized as a promising technique in
wireless networks, which allows geographically distributed
nodes (such as BSs) to cooperatively transmit or decode
information at a symbol level. By efficiently exploit the
inter-cell interference via symbol-level signal processing, the
CoMP technique can significantly enhance the communication
reliability and increase the data-rate throughput, especially for
users at the cell edge [19]. The recently emerging cloud radio
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the secrecy UAV communication system with CoMP
reception, in the presence of colluding suspicious eavesdroppers.
access networks (C-RAN) can be viewed as another form of
CoMP [20, 21]. Motivated by its great success in cellular net-
works, there have been some prior works employing CoMP for
secrecy communication [22] and UAV communications [23],
respectively. For example, [23] considered the CoMP trans-
mission among a number of UAVs in the sky to serve ground
users, in which these UAVs employ zero-forcing beamforming
to cancel the interference among users for enhancing the
throughput. However, to our best knowledge, there is no
existing works investigating the secure UAV communications
with CoMP. This thus motivates our investigation in this paper.
In this paper, we consider the secrecy UAV communication
with CoMP reception, in which one UAV communicates
with multiple legitimate GNs, in the presence of multiple
suspicious eavesdroppers. We consider that these GNs are
enabled to cooperatively decode the legitimate messages sent
from the UAV to defend against the eavesdropping attack,
and these eavesdroppers are colluding in intercepting the
messages, which corresponds to the worst-case eavesdroppers
from the security perspective. Different from previous works
that focused on 2D horizontal trajectory design, we further ex-
ploit the vertical trajectory (or equivalently, altitude) via three-
dimensional (3D) trajectory design, together with the transmit
power allocation, to facilitate the secure communication. In
particular, our objective is to maximize the average secrecy
rate from the UAV to the GNs over a finite communication
period, by jointly optimizing the UAV’s 3D trajectory and
transmit power allocation, subject to the maximum flight
speed and maximum power constraints. Due to the coupling
between transmit power and trajectory variables, the formu-
lated secrecy rate maximization problem is non-convex, which
is very difficult to be solved optimally. Towards this end, we
propose an alternating optimization based approach, which
solves the transmit power allocation and trajectory design
problems alternately, by using the convex optimization and
successive convex approximation (SCA) techniques, respec-
tively. Numerical results show that the joint 3D trajectory
and transmit power optimization greatly enhances the secrecy
performance in the scenario with CoMP reception, as com-
pared to other benchmark schemes with e.g. 2D trajectory
optimization only.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider the secrecy UAV com-
munication system, in which one UAV communicates to K
GNs in the presence of J colluding eavesdroppers on the
ground. With CoMP reception, the distributed GNs can jointly
decode the legitimate messages sent from the UAV. We focus
on a particular UAV mission/flight period with duration T
in second (s), which is discretized into N time slots with
equal duration ts = T/N . Let N , {1, . . . , N} denote
the set of slots. Without loss of generality, we consider a
3D Cartesian coordinate system, in which the UAV exploits
the fully-controllable mobility to change its 3D locations
over time, in order to achieve better secrecy communication
performance. Let (x[n], y[n], H [n]) denote the time-varying
3D UAV location at time slot n ∈ N , where q[n] =
(x[n], y[n]) denotes the horizontal location of the UAV, and
H [n] denotes its vertical location or altitude. Also, suppose
that q[0] = (x[0], y[0]) and q[N + 1] = (x[N + 1], y[N + 1])
denote the UAV’s pre-determined initial and final horizontal
locations, and H [0] and H [N + 1] denote the corresponding
altitudes, respectively. Let V˜ denote the UAV’s maximum
horizontal speed in meters/second (m/s), and V = V˜ ts denote
the maximum horizontal displacement of the UAV between
two consecutive slots. It then follows that
‖q[n+ 1]− q[n]‖ ≤ V, ∀n ∈ {0} ∪ N , (1)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. Similarly, let V˜up
and V˜down denote the maximum vertical ascending speed
and vertical descending speed, respectively. Then, we have
Vup = V˜upts and Vdown = V˜downts as the maximum vertical
ascending displacement and vertical descending displacement,
respectively. Let Hmin and Hmax denote the minimally and
maximally allowed UAV flight altitudes, respectively, for e.g.
safety reasons based on certain regulations. Accordingly, we
have
H [n+ 1]−H [n] ≤ Vup, ∀n ∈ {0} ∪ N , (2a)
H [n]−H [n+ 1] ≤ Vdown, ∀n ∈ {0} ∪ N , (2b)
Hmin ≤ H [n] ≤ Hmax, ∀n ∈ N . (2c)
Furthermore, we denote the fixed horizontal location of GN k
as wk ∈ R
2, k ∈ K , {1, . . . ,K}, and that of eavesdropper
j as wej ∈ R2, j ∈ J , {1, . . . , J}.
Different from prior works that normally considered the
free-space path loss model for A2G links with path loss
exponent 2 [10–13, 15–18], we adopt a more practical LoS
channel model with a generic path loss exponent α that is de-
termined by the radio propagation environment. Accordingly,
the channel power gain from the UAV to each GN k ∈ K at
slot n ∈ N is given by
g˜k[n] =
β0
dαk [n]
=
β0
(||q[n]−wk||2 +H2[n])
α
2
, (3)
where β0 denotes the channel power gain at the reference
distance of 1 m and dk[n] is the distance from the UAV to
GN k at slot n. Similarly, the channel power gain from the
UAV to eavesdropper j ∈ J at slot n ∈ N is
h˜j [n] =
β0
dαej [n]
=
β0
(||q[n]−wej ||2 +H2[n])
α
2
, (4)
where dej [n] is the distance from UAV to eavesdropper j at
slot n.
Next, we consider the secure communication from the UAV
to the K legitimate GNs. At time slot n ∈ N , let pt[n]
denote the transmit power by the UAV and s denote the
transmitted symbol that is a circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian (CSCG) random variable with zero mean and unit
variance, i.e., s ∼ CN (0, 1). In this case, the received signals
at each GN k ∈ K and eavesdropper j ∈ J at slot n ∈ N
are respectively given as
yb,k[n] =
√
g˜k[n]pt[n]s+ nb,k, (5)
ye,j [n] =
√
h˜j [n]pt[n]s+ ne,j , (6)
where nb,k and ne,j denote the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at the receivers of GN k and eavesdropper
j, respectively, each with zero mean and variance σ2, i.e.,
nb,k ∼ CN (0, σ2), ne,j ∼ CN (0, σ2). Then, the received
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) from the UAV to GN k ∈ K
and eavesdropper j ∈ J at slot n ∈ N are respectively given
as γk[n] = gk[n]pt[n], (7)
εj[n] = hj [n]pt[n], (8)
where for notational convenience, gk[n] = g˜k[n]/σ
2 and
hj [n] = h˜j [n]/σ
2 are defined as the channel-power-to-noise
ratios from the UAV to GN k and eavesdropper j, respectively.
Furthermore, suppose that the UAV is subject to a maximum
average power Pave and a maximum peak power Ppeak, where
Pave ≤ Ppeak. Then we have
1
N
∑
n∈N
pt[n] ≤ Pave, (9a)
0 ≤ pt[n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀n ∈ N . (9b)
By employing the optimal maximal ratio combining
(MRC), the K distributed GNs cooperate in decoding the
legitimate message s from the UAV. In this case, the received
SNR at the GNs at slot n is given as
γ[n] =
∑
k∈K
γk[n] =
∑
k∈K
gk[n]pt[n]. (10)
In addition, as the eavesdroppers are colluding, they can
intercept/decode the confidential message s from the UAV
by using the MRC. Accordingly, the received SNR at the
eavesdroppers is
ε[n] =
∑
j∈J
εj [n] =
∑
j∈J
hj [n]pt[n]. (11)
As a result, the secrecy rate from the UAV to the K GNs
at time slot n (in bits-per-second-per-Hertz, bps/Hz) is given
by [16]
R[n] = [log2 (1 + γ[n])− log2 (1 + ε[n])]
+
,
=
[
log2
(
1+
∑
k∈K
γk[n]
)
−log2
(
1+
∑
j∈J
εj [n]
)]+
, (12)
where [x]+ , max(x, 0).
Our objective is to jointly optimize the 3D UAV trajectory
{q[n], H [n]} and the transmit power allocation {pt[n]}, to
maximize the average secrecy rate from the UAV to GNs over
the whole duration-T period (i.e., 1N
∑
n∈N R[n]), subject
to the maximum UAV speed constraints in (1) and (2), and
the maximum power constraints in (9). The secrecy rate
maximization problem is thus formulated as
(P1) : max
{q[n],H[n],pt[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R[n],
s.t. (1), (2), and (9).
Note that the objective function of problem (P1) is non-smooth
(due to the operator [·]+) and non-concave, with variables
{pt[n]} and {q[n], H [n]} coupled. Therefore, problem (P1)
is a non-convex optimization problem, which is generally
difficult to be optimally solved.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO PROBLEM (P1)
In this section, we propose an efficient solution to problem
(P1). First, we handle the non-smoothness of the objective
function of problem (P1). Towards this end, we omit the [·]+
operator in the objective function of (P1), and re-expressed
(P1) as the following problem (P2). According to Lemma 1
in [11], the transmit power allocation optimization in (P1) can
always lead to a non-negative secrecy rate at each time slot.
Therefore, problems (P1) and (P2) are equivalent.
(P2) : max
{q[n],H[n],pt[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R¯[n],
s.t. (1), (2), and (9),
where R¯[n] = log2 (1 + γ[n])− log2 (1 + ε[n]) , ∀n ∈ N .
Next, we focus on solving problem (P2), which, however,
is still non-convex. To tackle this issue, we use the alternating
optimization method to optimize the transmit power allocation
{pt[n]} and UAV trajectory {q[n], H [n]} in an alternating
manner, by considering the other to be given.
A. Transmit Power Allocation Optimization
First, we optimize the UAV’s transmit power {pt[n]} under
given UAV trajectory {q[n], H [n]}, for which the optimization
problem is expressed as
(P3) : max
{pt[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R¯[n],
s.t. (9).
Notice that in this case, R¯[n] can be re-expressed as
R¯[n] = log2 (1 + anpt[n])− log2 (1 + bnpt[n]) , (13)
where an and bn are constants given as
an =
∑
k∈K
gk[n], (14)
bn =
∑
j∈J
hj [n]. (15)
It is evident that for problem (P3), under any time slot
n ∈ N , if the effective legitimate communication link has a
stronger channel power gain than the effective eavesdropping
link, i.e., an > bn, then the rate function R¯[n] is a concave and
monotonically increasing function with respect to the transmit
power pt[n] ≥ 0; otherwise, it can be easily shown that the
maximum of R¯[n] is zero, which is attained at pt[n] = 0.
Therefore, we only need to consider the power allocation
optimization over a subset N of time slots, with N ⊆ N , and
an > bn, ∀n ∈ N . In this case, problem (P3) is equivalently
re-expressed as
(P4) : max
{pt[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R¯[n],
s.t.
1
N
∑
n∈N
pt[n] ≤ Pave, (16a)
0 ≤ pt[n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀n ∈ N . (16b)
The reformulated problem (P4) is convex and thus can be
optimally solved by the Karush-kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condi-
tions [24]. Let υ denote the Lagrange multiplier associated
with constraint (16a), as well as λn and λn, n ∈ N denote
the Lagrange multipliers associated with pt[n] ≥ 0 and
pt[n] ≤ Ppeak, respectively. Suppose that the optimal primal
power allocation solution to problem (P4) are {p∗t [n]} and
the optimal Lagrange multipliers are υ∗, {λ∗n}, and {λ
∗
n},
respectively. Then based on the KKT conditions, they should
satisfy the following sufficient and necessary conditions.
υ∗ ≥ 0, (17a)
0 ≤ p∗t [n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀n ∈ N , (17b)
λ∗n ≥ 0, λ
∗
n ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , (17c)
λ∗np
∗
t [n] = 0, ∀n ∈ N , (17d)
λ
∗
n(p
∗
t [n]− Ppeak) = 0, ∀n ∈ N , (17e)
1
ln 2
(
an
1+anp∗t [n]
−
bn
1+bnp∗t [n]
)
+λ∗n−λ
∗
n=υ
∗,∀n∈N . (17f)
Based on the above KKT conditions in (17), the optimal
solution to problem (P4) is given as
p∗t [n] = min(Ppeak, p˜
∗
t [n]), ∀n ∈ N . (18)
where p˜∗t [n] =
[
−an−bn+
√
(an−bn)
2+4anbn(
an−bn
υ∗ ln 2
)
2anbn
]+
. By
combining (18) with the fact that the optimal pt[n] should
be zero for any n ∈ N \ N , it thus follows that the optimal
solution to problem (P3) is
p⋆t [n] =
{
p∗t [n], n ∈ N ,
0, n ∈ N \ N .
(19)
Notice that p∗t [n]’s in (18) are only dependent on the optimal
Lagrange multiplier υ∗, which can be obtained via a bisection
search based on υ∗
(
1
N
∑
n∈N p
∗
t [n]− Pave
)
= 0. Therefore,
the transmit power allocation problem (P3) is finally solved
optimally.
B. Trajectory Optimization
Next, we optimize the UAV trajectory {q[n], H [n]} under
any given transmit power allocation {pt[n]}, for which the
optimization problem is expressed as
(P5) : max
{q[n],H[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R¯[n],
s.t. (1) and (2).
By introducing auxiliary variables {ζk[n]} and {ηj[n]},
problem (P5) is equivalently re-expressed as
(P6) : max
{q[n],H[n],ζk[n],ηj[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
Rˆ[n]
s.t. ζk[n]≥
(
||q[n]−wk||
2+H2[n]
)α
2 , ∀k∈K, n∈N , (20a)
ηj [n]≤
(
||q[n]−wej ||
2+H2[n]
)α
2 ,∀j∈J , n∈N , (20b)
(1), (2),
where Rˆ[n]=log2
(
1+
∑
k∈K
β0pt[n]
ζk[n]
)
−log2
(
1+
∑
j∈J
β0pt[n]
ηj [n]
)
.
Notice that the function Rˆ[n] in the objective function and
the right-hand-side (RHS) term in constraint (20b) are convex
with respect to {q[n], H [n]}, which make problem (P6) non-
convex. To tackle the non-convexity issue, we apply the SCA
technique to obtain a converged solution in an alternating
manner. At each iteration m ≥ 1, suppose that the local
trajectory point is given as {q(m)[n], H(m)[n]}. Then, we have
the lower bounds for the function Rˆ[n] and the RHS term of
(20b) as follows based on the first-order Taylor expansion.(
||q[n]−wej ||
2 +H2[n]
)α/2
≥ α
[
H(m)[n](H [n]−H(m)[n]) + (q(m)[n]−wej)
× (q[n]− q(m)[n])
](
||q(m)[n]−wej ||
2 +H(m)2[n]
)(α−2)/2
+
(
||q(m)[n]−wej ||
2 +H(m)2[n]
)α/2
, Elbej [n], (21)
Rˆ[n]≥ Rˆ(m)[n], log2
(
1+
∑
k∈K
β0pt[n]
ζ
(m)
k [n]
)
−log2
(
1+
∑
j∈J
β0pt[n]
ηj [n]
)
−
1
ln 2
(
1+
∑
k∈K
β0pt[n]
ζ
(m)
k [n]
)−1∑
k∈K
(
β0pt[n]
ζ
(m)2
k [n]
(
ζk[n]−ζ
(m)
k [n]
))
.
(22)
Replacing (20b) and Rˆ[n] with the RHS terms in (21) and
(22), respectively, problem (P6) is approximately expressed
as the following convex optimization problem that can be
efficiently solved by CVX [25].
(P7.m) : max
{q[n],H[n],ζk[n],ηj [n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
Rˆ(m)[n],
s.t. ηj [n] ≤ E
lb
ej [n], ∀j ∈ J , n ∈ N ,
(1), (2), and (20a). (23)
Therefore, at iteration (m+1), we update the UAV trajec-
tory point {q(m+1)[n], H(m+1)[n]} as the optimal solution to
the approximate problem (P7.m), under the local trajectory
point {q(m)[n], H(m)[n]} in the previous iteration m. As the
iteration converges, we can obtain an efficient solution to
problem (P5).
To sum up, we solve for the transmit power {pt[n]} and
the trajectory {q[n], H [n]} in an alternating manner above,
and accordingly, we obtain an efficient solution to problem
(P2). As the objective value of problem (P2) is monotonically
non-decreasing after each iteration and the objective value of
problem (P2) is finite, the proposed alternating optimization
based approach is guaranteed to converge [26]. In Section IV,
we will conduct simulations to show the effectiveness of the
proposed algorithm.
Remark 3.1: It should be noticed that the performance of
our proposed alternating-optimization-based approach criti-
cally depends on the initial point for iteration. In this paper,
we consider the following fly-hover-fly trajectory as the initial
point. In this design, the UAV first flies straightly at the
maximum speed from the initial location to the top of one
GN, then hovers with the maximum duration, and finally flies
straightly at the maximum speed to the final location. We
choose the hovering location as the point above the GN at the
most central point among these GNs.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we conduct numerical results to validate the
performance of our proposed design. In the simulation, unless
otherwise stated, we use the following settings to obtain the
numerical results: w1 = (−100 m, 300 m), w2 = (0, 300 m),
w3 = (100 m, 300 m), we1 = (−100 m, 100 m), we2 =
(100 m, 100 m), q[0] = (−500 m, 0), q[N +1] = (500 m, 0),
H [0] = H [N + 1] = 200 m, Hmin = 150 m, Hmax = 250 m,
ts = 0.5 s, α = 2, V˜ = 25 m/s, V˜up = 4 m/s, V˜down = 6 m/s,
Pave = 30 dBm, Ppeak = 4Pave, and β0/σ
2 = 50 dB.
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Fig. 2. Convergence behavior of our proposed design.
Fig. 2 shows the convergence behavior of our proposed
design, in terms of the average achievable secrecy rate versus
the number of iterations. It is observed that under different
mission durations T = 45 s, T = 50 s, and T = 60 s,
the average achievable secrecy rate converges within around
2, 2, and 4 iterations, respectively. This thus validates the
effectiveness and convergence of our propose design.
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Figs. 3 and 4 show the obtained trajectories and transmit
powers of the UAV by our proposed design, under mission
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Fig. 4. Obtained UAV altitude and transmit power over time by the proposed
design.
duration T = 45 s, T = 50 s, and T = 60 s, respectively. It is
observed that for the three mission duration values, the UAV
flies apart from eavesdroppers but close to the GNs following
arc paths. When T is large (e.g., T = 60 s), the UAV is
observed to hover at an optimized point with longest duration.
By contrast, when T is small (e.g., T = 45 s or 50 s), the
UAV is observed to fly at the maximum speed towards the
hovering location as close as possible, but they cannot exactly
reach there due to the time and speed limitations. It is also
observed that when the UAV is close to the eavesdroppers, it
lifts its altitude and decreases the transmit power to prevent
the undesirable information leakage. By contrast, when UAV
is far away from the eavesdroppers but close to the GNs, the
UAV drops its altitude and increases the transmit power to
enhance the desirable information transmission. Under such
an optimized trajectory and transmit power allocation policy,
the UAV can significantly enhance the secrecy communication
performance by effectively balancing between the desirable
information transmission versus undesirable information leak-
age.
40 45 50 55 60 65
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Av
er
ag
e 
se
cr
ec
y 
ra
te
 (b
ps
/H
z)
T (second)
 
 Proposed joint 3D trajectory design with adaptive power allocation
Proposed joint 2D trajectory design with adaptive power allocation
Fly−hover−fly trajectory with adaptive power allocation
Fly−hover−fly trajectory with constant power allocation
Fig. 5. Average secrecy rate versus mission duration T .
Fig. 5 shows the average achievable secrecy rate versus
the mission duration T . For comparison, we consider the
following three benchmark schemes.
1) Joint 2D trajectory design with adaptive power alloca-
tion: The UAV flies at a fixed altitude H , and jointly
optimizes its 2D horizontal trajectory and the transmit
power allocation to maximize the average secrecy rate.
This design can be implemented by solving (P1) under
the special case with Hmax = Hmin = H . For this
design, we set the fixed altitude as H = 200 m.
2) Fly-hover-fly trajectory with adaptive power allocation:
The UAV adopts the fly-hover-fly trajectory in Remark
3.1, during which it adaptively optimizes the transmit
power allocation by solving problem (P3).
3) Fly-hover-fly trajectory with constant power allocation:
The UAV adopts the fly-hover-fly trajectory in Remark
3.1, during which it employs the constant power allo-
cation, i.e., pt[n] = Pave, ∀n ∈ N .
It is observed that as T increases, the secrecy rates achieved
by all the four schemes increase. This is due to the fact that
in this case, the UAV can fly closer towards the hovering
location and hover there with longer duration, thus leading
to higher average achievable secrecy rate. When T is small
(e.g. T = 40 s), the two schemes with joint 3D and 2D
trajectory design and adaptive power allocation are observed
to have a similar performance as the fly-hover-fly trajectory
with adaptive power allocation. This is due to the fact that
in this case, the block duration is only sufficient for the
UAV to fly from the initial to final locations, and there is
no additional time to adjust the trajectory for communication
performance optimization. When T becomes large, the two
schemes with joint 3D and 2D trajectory design and adaptive
power allocation are observed to significantly outperform
the two benchmark schemes with fly-hover-fly trajectory.
Furthermore, it is observed that there is a large performance
gap between the proposed 3D trajectory design with adaptive
power allocation versus the 2D trajectory design with adaptive
power allocation. This shows the significance of adapting the
vertical UAV trajectory or altitude in enhancing the secrecy
UAV communication performance with CoMP reception.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the CoMP reception-enabled
secrecy UAV communication system, in which multiple GNs
cooperatively detect the legitimate information sent from the
UAV to enhance the legitimate communication performance.
We jointly optimized the UAV’s 3D trajectory and trans-
mit power allocation to maximize the average secrecy rate.
However, due to the non-convexity, this problem is generally
difficult to be solved optimally. Towards this end, we proposed
to use the alternating optimization technique for solving the
joint 3D trajectory and power allocation optimization, in
an alternating manner, by convex optimization and SCA,
respectively. Numerical results showed that the proposed
design significantly improves the average secrecy rate from
the legitimate UAV transmitter to the GNs, as compared to
other benchmark schemes. How to extend the results to other
scenarios, e.g., with multiple UAVs and multi-antenna GNs,
are interesting directions worth further investigation.
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